

21 June 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR : Mr. Bross

SUBJECT : Memorandum from Enthoven to Nitze Re. TOD

1. There are two statements in the Enthoven memorandum that indicate the degree of ignorance that exists within the O/SA concerning the fundamentals of the intelligence business:

a. "I am eliminating separate identification by processing, collection and production."

b. "Also, since the allocation of manpower to each target has not proven to be useful, each reporting unit should identify only its total manpower force."


2. Respecting 1a. above, anyone familiar with the intelligence business is aware that the normal functional mix between collection - processing - production always gives overpowering leverage to the collection function, so that a relatively small reduction in collection resources will overcome substantial increases in the other two. For instance, because the overall average mix for FY 68 was 70% - 22% - 8% a 10% decline in collection resources counteracts an 87% increase in production and gives the impression, if one looks only at the combined figure, that there has been no change in the level of effort. This is what happened in the China situation with respect to the military subject targets - relatively small declines in the collection area completely masked substantial increases in the production effort on all targets, if you looked only at the gross figure for all three functions combined.

3. With respect to 1b. above, this statement ignores the fact that finished intelligence is only produced by the application of the human mind to the work of analysing the raw material that has been collected and processed. The number and the quality of the manpower involved in the intelligence effort must be appropriately identified. One major fault with the present TOD manpower data is that it follows a sort of "one man one vote" rule and gives the same weight to the eighteen year old airman at SAC as it does to the Chairman of the BNF, and without identification of either. Gross reporting of a unit's manpower without further identification of targeting would be a worthless exercise.

4. The fundamental knowledge gap that appears to exist between the O/SA on one hand and yourself and the DCI on the other with respect to the fundamentals of the intelligence business will make it extremely difficult for you to reach any meeting of the minds on our TOD problem.

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5. Under the circumstances I would suggest that you and the DCI take the position that the DOD can call on its intelligence units to report for whatever information they desire, but the DCI on his part has very specific information needs that must be met in order for him to carry out the responsibilities assigned to him in the NSCID's and by Presidential letters. You and he should state further that you would prefer to get this information through the normal reporting channels of the DOD and with the least inconvenience to the reporting units. However, any gaps in the information you require will be filled by exercise of the DCI authority under Paragraph 3c of NSCID #1 to make such surveys of U.S. intelligence activities as he may deem necessary to carry out his duty to advise the National Security Council and coordinate the intelligence effort of the U.S.



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